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Abstract In this article we investigate the problem of applying agile practices into safety-
critical projects. The goal of our research is to investigate potential benefits
from introducing agile practices into safety-critical environment and to present a
solution providing for balancing agile approach with more disciplined assurance
techniques, bringing the best of the two worlds together. In this article we
present the supporting ideas such as assurance argument patterns along with
a case study. The case study investigates how software engineers perceive risks
associated with the introduction of agile practices and collect their ideas on how
these risks could be mitigated.
Keywords software development, safety-critical projects, agile practices, experimental
assessment, TRUST-IT
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1. Introduction
Agile methodologies have grown in popularity since the presentation of the Agile
Manifesto in 2001 [1]. They were introduced as an alternative to plan-driven me-
thodologies, which were considered as being too restrictive in some circumstances,
in particular, while dealing with volatile requirements and ever changing market de-
mands. In such situations, heavy-weight documentation and low flexibility associated
with plan-driven approach could have an impeding effect on software development
process [13]. In response to these concerns agile methodologies have offered practices
which value a close relationship with clients, allow a more relaxed approach towards
documentation and provide a flexible development lifecycle based on short iterations.
While agile approaches have gained an almost immediate acclaim among SMEs and
companies involved in non-critical projects, they were received with much distrust by
larger companies and software engineers engaged in long-term and/or critical projects.
In the case of such projects, the predictability and stability of plan-driven methodo-
logies can bring expected profits [27] by facilitating the certification processes and
establishing a repetitive quality. The up-front analysis and rigorous documentation
provide valuable foundations for further risk management and process traceability
[12]. What is more, some companies have years of experience in managing their pro-
jects following plan-driven practices, therefore they have acquired the know-how that
increases trust towards this approach [17], [32]. In [26], major challenges related to
moving from plan-driven to agile practices were summarized from a large corporate
company’s perspective.
While plan-driven methodologies have proven its value and usefulness in safety-
critical projects, the evolving market of software products of the last few years puts
this approach to the test. A growing competition, ever changing technologies and more
diverse groups of clients have changed the expectations towards software development
methods. The need to deliver systems of acceptable quality, faster and at lower cost
in comparison to competitors evoked seeking an alternative [28].
In this paper we discuss the models of combining agile and plan-driven practices
as well as their potential applications in safety-critical projects that were introduced in
the literature thus far. The main objective of our research is to develop a method that
would allow to combine agile and more disciplined practices in safety-critical projects
while keeping the acceptable level of safety assurance in accordance with the norms
and the standards applicable for a given product. The solution will be evaluated in
terms of added value for manufacturing processes of safety-related software. In this
paper we present the supporting ideas such as assurance argument patterns along
with a case study.
2. Balancing agility and discipline
For many years it has been prejudicially believed that agile methodologies are at
odds with maturity models and certification schemes [18]. This point of view might
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stem from the outdated notions based on inflexible models such as the Capability
Maturity Model (replaced with the Capability Maturity Model Integration [4]) and
an oversimplification of agile values [18]. In fact, present-day models provide more
freedom than their predecessors while agile methodologies are not about the lack of
documentation and recklessness.
Attempts to combine the best of the two approaches, the agile and the disciplined
one, have been presented as early as in 2003 [13] and initiated a global discussion about
the need and applicability of such hybrid methodologies. Successfully combined, agile
practices can potentially reduce the cost of production as well as time to market
while more mature practices could improve the quality of the product and enable
better control of the development process. As a result, some models adapting agile
practices into maturity models such as CMMI have been introduced since then [16],
[25], [15], [14], providing new possibilities for companies engaged in long-term and
critical projects. What is more, case studies and evidence of successful applications
of such balanced approaches have been provided as well [18], [23], [29], [11], [30], [24].
3. Introducing agile practices to the safety-critical domain
In recent years a growing competition in the IT market has also influenced the safety-
critical domain. When it comes to medical software companies, they have evolved
from supporting only hospitals and doctors to providing personalized e-health so-
ftware solutions and equipment for individual patients. It has become crucial to offer
better software, more appealing to a client while keeping the costs low, in order to
compete in this fast changing and growing market. Consequently, there is a strong
demand for increasing efficiency of software development processes (in terms of effort,
user satisfaction and time) while still respecting the safety requirements imposed by
relevant standards, regulations and recommendations1.
3.1. Applications of the hybrid approaches
There is a growing body of evidence supporting the theory that incorporating agile
practices into safety-critical projects is not only feasible but also potentially profitable.
In 2003 Alleman et al. [10] presented an approach combining eXtreme Programming
practices [7] with Earned Value Management [6] that was successfully implemented in
a government contracted project. In their article they described their experiences and
improvements obtained by using this approach although the approach itself was not
sufficiently illustrated and little was mentioned about which features of the product
and its certificates had influenced the choice of practices.
Consecutive reports were more specific about successful implementations of their
hybrid approaches. Rasmussen et al. [31] described the application of a tailor-made
1For instance, US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommends explicit assurance cases
for medical devices which will impact on the whole related suppliers market
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agile approach in a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulated project in Ab-
bott company. As a result of the rapid expansion of the market, which demanded
responding to the changing requirements as well as reducing production cost, the
company decided to employ a software engineering organization AgileTek [2], which
developed the Agile+ solution. They managed to improve their processes and achie-
ved the financial goals by introducing a more agile approach while still maintaining
the acceptable level of FDA safety assurance. Unfortunately, because of a commercial
aspect of the Agile+ it was only briefly described in the article, making it difficult for
other companies to benefit from Abbott experiences without external help.
Another interesting case study was presented in an article by Petersen and Wohlin
[28] in which they described the application of agile practices at Ericsson AB, which
is certified with ISO 9001:2000. They focused on comparing how the perceived impe-
diments have changed owing to the introduction of agile practices. The improvements
were noticeable as most of the concerns raised in relation to the plan-driven metho-
dologies were alleviated as well the number of perceived impediments was reduced by
introducing a more agile approach.
3.2. Models for adopting agile to safety-critical development
The increasing number of reports suggesting that adapting agile practices to suit
safety-critical processes can bring measurable profits provoked the need for a model
of such adaptation.
In the literature we can find some attempts to propose such models. Weiguo
and Xiaomin [35] presented an approach suitable for FDA compliant medical devices
projects. Their method was based on the idea of combining an incremental character of
developing code with a classic, waterfall-like way of preparing project documentation.
Unfortunately, the model was insufficiently described and we know very little about its
possible implementations. Stephenson, McDermid and Ward [34] presented another
model for tailoring agile practices to suit safety-critical systems. They called it the
Agile Health Model and it was built around the idea of modular structures and risk
management techniques known from plan-driven methodologies. However, the model
was in the preliminary stage, introduced mainly in order to prove the possibility of
applying agile practices into safety-critical projects, and no case study was provided
as well.
A more complex and well described model was presented by Paige et al. [27].
They collated agile and safety principles and demonstrated the key challenges that
need to be addressed when formulating a hybrid approach. Their main concerns were
different approaches towards communication, documentation, customer participation,
multiple-domain engineering, testing and incrementality. Indeed, as much as agile
methodologies value an active customer participation it is often impossible in safety-
critical systems to keep in touch with every group of stakeholders, in particular if
we take external certification organizations into consideration as well. Testing and
incrementality, both crucial to the agile development, are also difficult to reconcile
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with safety requirements. Agile testing strategy is based on unit and black-box tests
while in order to satisfy certification bodies it is important to incorporate costly
and time consuming white-box and acceptance tests. What is more, the incremental
product development, one of the key attributes of all agile methodologies, can impede
the process of certification and preparation of safety arguments as they should be
addressed up-front with all of the requirements and risks known beforehand.
Paige et al.’s solution concentrates on the following ideas: pair-programming of
software and system engineers, the introduction of risk management techniques, usage
of tools for generating documentation from source code and tackling the incrementa-
lity by using “pipelined iterations” consisted of the minor and major iterations with
acceptance tests at the end of every major one. Their model was implemented in a case
study in which an Integrated Altitude Data Display System (IADDS) for planes was
developed. As a result, their approach was put to the test as their solutions proved
to be insufficient in some aspects. They concluded that although “XP and Aps (Agile
practices) in general were not designed with safety-critical systems development in
mind, they can be adapted to that sort of development”, “it is rather unlikely that
level A software can be produced in the near future with the modifications made to
the process so far” [27].
While these models of adapting agile practices to suit safety-critical projects are
valuable sources of knowledge, there is still a need to develop a more easy to use and
thorough set of guidelines for safety-critical software companies that would like to
adapt agile practices into their project development.
4. Assurance argument patterns
In [22] we have proposed an approach in which agile practices are introduced to
a development process in a controlled way, by applying assurance argument patterns.
This leads to a method which supports combining agile and more disciplined practices
in safety-critical projects while keeping the acceptable level of safety assurance, in
accordance with the assurance criteria chosen for a given product. The source of
these criteria are the relevant guidelines, norms and standards related to a given
application domain.
An argument is a data structure that includes claims, assumptions, facts and
evidence. A claim can be related to other claims, facts and/or assumptions through
an inference. In such cases this claim is called conclusion and the claims, facts and
assumptions linked to it by the inference are called its premises. The inference linking
the promises with the conclusion justifies why while accepting the premises we are
entitled to accept the conclusion. An inference is associated with a warrant which
justifies why the related conclusion should be accepted from the premises. If a gi-
ven premise is a claim, it is considered as a conclusion to be further justified by its
own premises. If a premise is an assumption, it does not require further justification.
If a premise is a fact, it is required that it is supported by evidence submitted in
external documents. Such documents are linked to the fact by means of references.
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To provide for more structure, the arguments use also the information nodes which
can occur in any place of the argument structure. This model of an argument belongs
to the TRUST-IT methodology [21], [19], [20] which also provides for graphical re-
presentation of arguments. The methodology is supported by a platform of software
services, called NOR-STA, which provide for arguments creation, editing, publishing,
integration with evidence and assessment [9].
An assurance argument pattern is an incomplete argument. A pattern has ‘dan-
gling references’ which do not point to any evidence – the evidence is missing in the
pattern. It is also possible, that the pattern contains unjustified claims which need to
be argued for in a more detailed way. After providing the evidence and completing
unjustified claims, the pattern is converted into an argument.
An example argument pattern is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1. An example argument pattern following the TRUST-IT argument model.
The pattern presented in Figure1 represents the top level decomposition of an
argument tree related to conformity with ISO/IEC 27001 standard on information
security management. The tree is represented from left to the right (just like the
file directory trees in an operating system interface). Figure 1 shows the information
nodes (labeled ‘I’) structuring the argument pattern. The information node labeled ‘I5’
contains the claim (denoted ‘CL ISO27001: Compliance with ISO/IEC 27001:2005’)
which predicates conformity with the standard ISO/IEC 27001. The conformity is
validated by the claim’s decomposition into more specific claims and finally ends
with asserting facts. Figure 1 presents the decomposition of the argumentation to
five more specific claims. The inference (represented by the node labeled ‘Arg’ and
the associated warrant labeled ‘W’) relating these more specific claims (the premises)
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to the higher level claim (the conclusion) is based on structure of the standard (its
decomposition into chapters).
We assume that such argument patterns can be built for a given software develop-
ment project by analyzing the requirements of the relevant guidelines and standards
related to software assurance in a given domain. The requirements can address both,
the (software) product to be developed and the development process leading to this
product. In our research, the primary focus is on the development process and on the
assurance that is required in case agile practices are incorporated to the process.
In order to better understand the safety risks introduced by the agile software
practices we plan for a series of experiments and cases during which we will attempt
to assess these risks. The remainder of this paper describes a case study in which
junior software engineers were involved in the risk assessment process.
5. Case study
The domain of medical safety-critical software has been developing at an unpreceden-
ted speed over the past few years. In addition to supplying hospitals and providing
solutions for medical staff it now brings a wide variety of e-health technologies, inc-
luding personal medical equipment and devices. In order to not be left behind and
to reach bigger and more diverse customer groups, medical companies might look for
new software development processes to reduce costs, accelerate time to market and
improve product quality. For this reason we have decided to use that domain for our
case study.
The case study was carried out between the beginning of March 2012 and the
end of May 2012. For this study we have selected a group of 31 postgraduate stu-
dents from our university that specialize in the field of software engineering. Some
67% of them have already began to work as part-time employees in various software
companies and the majority of this group already have applied agile practices in their
industrial work. Although they did not yet have real experience with safety critical
software development, all participants have attended courses on plan-driven and agile
methodologies and completed the course on high integrity systems.
5.1. The case study objectives
The main objective of the case study was: to investigate how (junior) software engine-
ers identify and assess risks associated with applying selected agile practices to critical
software development and what are their suggestions concerning risk mitigation.
It is expected that the results of the case study will help to devise a checklist
of hazards as well as risk estimates and the suggestions for additional risk mitigation
practices for incorporating agile practices into safety-critical software development.
The metrics to be collected in the case study include:
• List of hazards for an insulin pump applied in its target environment.
• A complete list of agile practices.
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• A list of hazard scenarios explaining how applied agile practices contribute to
software hazards.
• Risk assessment (risk levels) associated with each agile practice used.
• Agile practices which carry the highest risk.
• A list of risk mitigation recommendations.
5.2. The case study domain description
We devised a fictional company called MediSoft and specified its operational activi-
ty as producing software for insulin infusion pumps. After observing an increasing
role of agile methodologies the company’s management team became interested in
the possible benefits that might be gained by utilizing such methodologies in their
workplace. As a way to investigate the effects of the introduction of agile approaches
into software development, MediSoft chose to carry out a pilot project whose aim is
to prepare software for insulin infusion pump. They would like to employ eXtreme
Programming [7] and Scrum [33] methodologies.
Figure 2. A context diagram of the insulin pump.
Students were divided into 11 project groups, each group consisting of not more
than 3 members. Every group was given a short description of MediSoft company as
well as product specification for standard infusion pump and guidelines on hazards
analysis. They were also supposed to use the Designsafe tool [5] for risk assessment
and MS Visio for fault trees editing.
An insulin pump is a device for patients with diabetes who need to control their
blood sugar level by administrating insulin. The pump is attached to the patient’s
body along with a small container filled with insulin. At the proper times, small
and precisely calculated amounts of insulin are released from the container into the
patient’s bloodstream. It helps to keep blood glucose levels steady between meals and
during sleep.
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At meal time, you can instruct the pump to deliver the amount of insulin needed
to match the grams of carbohydrate in the food that is eaten.
The insulin pump description used in the project is based on the Animas One-
Touch Ping [3], a real pump available on the market, characterized by the following
features:
• Calculator for carbohydrates, blood glucose corrections and insulin.
• Insulin bolus very precise, should allow dosing even the lowest amounts of insulin
in order to respond to every glucose deviation.
• Reminders for when to perform blood glucose checks.
• Easily available insulin dose corrections.
• Measuring the level of active insulin in the body.
• Wireless communication, the pump can be controlled with a wireless remote.
• Wireless bolus calculation and delivery.
• Uploading data from the pump to a computer using dedicated software.
• Information about the state of the body shown on the screen.
• Waterproof.
5.3. Participant’ tasks and the results.
The case study has been divided into three tasks. After completing each task, the
participants submitted the results using Moodle course management system [8].
Task 1. Preparing a list of hazards and hazard scenarios. Based on a documentation
of the insulin pump and their own knowledge and imagination each group prepared
a list of hazards connected with using the insulin pump in its target environment. This
hazards identification process was supported by a guideline obtained at the beginning
of the case study. The groups were also provided with an inventory of agile practices
represented in the Designsafe tool [5]. After identifying hazards, they were asked to
analyze the potential causes of each hazard and to document the result as a fault
trees (FTA diagrams in MS Visio). Of particular interest were these fault trees for
which the represented hazard scenarios were ‘anchored’ in the software development
practices. Some groups had their Designsafe tool ‘populated’ with Scrum practices
(see Figure 3) and the others with eXtreme Programming ones. The groups were free
to extend this initial seeding, if they found it necessary.
Task 2. Conducting risk assessment. Each group performed, with the help of De-
signsafe tool, a risk assessment for the introduction of agile practices to the project
developing software for the insulin pump.
Based on the fault trees prepared in Task 1, the groups analyzed the connection
between the development related impediments and the identified hazards. This work
resulted in refining the fault trees and possibly with refining the lists of development
process impediments submitted initially.
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Figure 3. A tree of Scrum process stages along with tasks and possible impediments.
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Then, the groups assessed the risk, assessing the severity of each hazard and the
likelihood of its materialization. An example of such a risk analysis is given (Table 1).
Table 1
An example of a simple hazard analysis (based on Designsafe layout).
Name Insulin overdose
Hazard category Software fault
Description The pump infuses a too high dosage of insulin due to insulin overflow or
air pressure in lines.
Users All
Connected Tasks Product Backlog/Requirements Managements, Risk management, Tech-
nical analysis, Dose calculation algorithm design, Implementation, User
Interface project, User’s guide preparation
Cause Faulty dose calculation algorithm, wrong requirements analysis, error in
the implementation, misleading user interface or manual, database error
Severity Catastrophic
Probability Likely
Risk Level High
Reduce Risk Extensive testing, up-front technical analysis, good contact with the
client representative, regular iterations, testing user interface and ma-
nual with real patients and doctors
Table 2 presents the risk assessment matrix used in this task.
Task 3. Proposing a list of risk mitigation practices. The groups were asked to
propose a list of additional practices that would mitigate the risks found in Task 2
and that could be used as an extension to the agile methodology they have been
working with.
Upon completion of the tasks, a common session was organized for all participants
were they were discussing on how incorporating agile practices into safety-critical
projects can affect the product risk and what mitigation actions could be employed
during the development process to lower the risk.
5.4. Results
Results of the tasks are summarized below. As the experiment was completed at the
beginning of June 2012, the raw data collected are not yet fully processed at the time
of writing this text. Nevertheless, some interesting observations can be made.
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Table 2
The risk assessment matrix.
Severity of harm
Probability of harm Catastrophic Serious Moderate Minor
Very Likely High High High Medium
Likely High High Medium Low
Unlikely Medium Medium Low Negligible
Remote Low Low Negligible Negligible
Table 3
A template for the additional practices description.
No. Name of the practice
Description A description of the proposed practice – what activities it inclu-
des, how should they be performed, by whom, at what stages of
the project.
Related hazards Which hazards (from your risk analysis) the practice is expected
to have influence on.
Expected influence What is the expected result of implementing the practice, in what
way it could reduce the risk, to what extent.
Agility/discipline balance How the practice will affect the agility of the methodology ie. will
it require some alterations in project roles or additional project
stages etc.
Results of Task 1. Overall, the 11 teams have distinguished 124 hazards and poten-
tially hazardous situations in total, at different levels of detail. The hazards were not
independent, often were synonymous, the differences were also in the scope and level
of detail. After rough processing, they can be grouped into the following categories:
• User errors (adjusted dose, incorrect configuration, etc.).
• Error in measuring the level of insulin or sugar.
• Physical / hardware errors.
• Missing or incorrectly administered insulin doses.
• Lack of measurement of insulin or sugar within a prescribed period.
• Errors in alerting system (sugar level, the needle slipped, discharging, etc.).
• Unauthorized use of the device via radio waves.
• Interruption of system normal activity.
• Incorrect display of data.
Most of the hazards were further analyzed in a form of fault trees. An example
is given in 4. The fault trees delivered as the result of this task were treated as
an input to the next task where the groups were aiming at assessing risks. They
were asked to concentrate on hazards connected with the software and human error
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Figure 4. An example Fault Tree from one of the groups (Kalenik, Kurszewski, Karewska).
rather than hardware or misfortunes, to drive them towards events originating in the
software development process. They were also encouraged to consider latent conditions
related to organizational structure and management practices, having in mind the
agile project development practices.
Results of Task 2. Risk assessment was performed with the help of Designsafe tool.
During this task the groups were also refining the fault trees developed in Task 1. The
results of risk assessment were presented in the tool, an example is given in Figure 5.
The project tasks associated with the highest risk together with their impedi-
ments are listed below.
For SCRUM:
• Product Backlog – incorrect identification of requirements.
• Sprints Plan – incomplete identification of requirements.
• General decisions concerning technology and architecture – lack of architecture
plan and crucial implementation decisions.
• General decisions concerning technology and architecture – incomplete architec-
ture plan and lacking crucial implementation decisions.
• Providing the requirements (client) – incorrect identification of requirements.
• Providing the requirements (client) – incomplete identification of requirements.
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For XP. Tasks along with their impediments which were associated with the
highest risk:
• User Stories – incomplete identification of requirements.
• Prototyping – too general plan for architecture and methods of implementing of
the system.
• Release scope: functionalities from previous iteration – large load on errors from
the previous iteration.
• Tests preparation – incomplete test plan.
• U nit tests – low coverage.
• Aacceptance tests – low coverage.
Results of Task 3. In this task the groups were asked to consider possibilities of
risk mitigation, especially for the hazards with the highest risk. The most commonly
proposed mitigation practices included:
• Introducing an expert knowledge into the project.
• Extensive testing (i.e. enhanced acceptance tests, Test Driven Development).
• Introducing safety standards.
• Improving quality assurance in relation to the artefacts different than the code
(i.e. preparing really ‘good’ User Stories).
• Keeping high coding standards.
6. Conclusion
The paper introduced our approach to the problem of introducing agile practices into
critical software development processes and then reported on the experiment during
which we attempted to investigate how this problem is perceived from the software
engineer’s perspective.
The data collected during the experiment were not yet finally processed, therefore
what is presented in this paper reports more on the scope of the raw data collected
than presents the final conclusions derived from these data. Nevertheless, even now
we can conclude that the participants of the experiment were generally optimistic
towards agile methodologies and their applicability to safety-critical projects. Their
opinions can be summarized as follows:
• Agile methodologies should be regarded as complementary to plan driven prac-
tices instead of being the replacement.
• Extensive testing and good identification of requirements are vital.
• Contact with domain experts and potential users is crucial.
• Safety assurance should be incremental – in parallel to iterations in development.
However, as the participants of the experiment were students we do not expect
that they performed their analyses at the expert level. Their output reflects the opi-
nions of junior software engineers, their concerns regarding adapting agile practices
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into critical software development and their views on possible improvements and com-
promises.
In further research we will aim at incorporating other views (for instance, softwa-
re developing companies, project managers, assessors, etc.). in order to learn which
practices cause most uneasiness and distrust and how they could be revised in or-
der to make them more compliant with safety standards. In parallel to this we will
investigate safety standards, guidelines and regulations (focusing on the e-health do-
main) to reflect them in the assurance argument pattern represented with the help of
TRUST-IT methodology and NOR-STA services.
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